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Theme: Economic security policies consist in the prevention and avoidance of all 
situations that can disrupt the life of either companies or States. In France, economic 
security is seen through the prism of ‘economic intelligence’, which aims to encompass all 
aspects of globalised risks and opportunities. 
 
 
Summary: State security policies are widening their scope far beyond the military aspect, 
while more and more companies include security concerns in their strategies and 
management. In broad terms, economic security policies consist in the prevention and 
avoidance of all situations that can disrupt the life of companies or States and their 
success depends on their ability to anticipate, imagine new schemes, adapt norms and 
structures to the changes and to build networks of competences and co-operation, 
particularly between the public and private sectors but also between States sharing the 
same general interests. Economic security and economic intelligence must not be 
understood as purely defensive, as a withdrawal into one’s shell, but as the first step for 
building active policies and alliances, the latter being a pre-requisite to act and seize 
opportunities in our globalised world. 
 
This ARI is based on the author’s contribution to the Panel on Economic Security at the 
seminar organised by the Elcano Royal Institute on 28 June 2010 to support the 
preparation of Spain’s Spanish Security Strategy. At the seminar she gave an account of 




Analysis: In parallel with the globalisation process, State security policies are widening 
their scope far beyond the military aspect, while more and more private companies 
include security concerns in their strategies and management. Economic Security is 
gaining private and public attention despite the difficulties in defining it. A broad and 
intelligent definition was provided at the Seminar held by the Elcano Royal Institute on 28 
June: economic security policies consist in the prevention and avoidance of all situations 
that can disrupt the life of either companies or States. Nevertheless, it is not easy to 
define economic security since it addresses innumerable issues that are more or less 
crucial, depending on the situation, the environment and the culture of the body 
concerned. We can find common threats and risks in countries that are similar, such as 
the nations of Europe, and we can learn from each other’s experiences, although it must 
be borne in mind that economic security policies and processes can never be off-the-peg 
but must be made to measure. 
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In France economic security is seen through the prism of ‘economic intelligence’, a 
concept devised in the early 90s. It remained in obscurity for 10 years, but was 
nevertheless known and applied by a few companies operating abroad, until it came into 
more public light at the end of 2003 when the National Assembly and the Economic and 
Social Council devoted significant reports to the subject. Until then, numerous articles and 
publications had underlined the French weaknesses and lack of awareness of the 
emerging economic risks and opportunities generated by the new international 
environment. Little by little, the concept and its concrete applications were clarified and 
sharpened. At the end of 2003, the nomination of a high civil servant in charge of 
economic intelligence near the Prime Minister (now under the authority of the Présidence 
de la République) strongly helped both private companies and State administrations to 
become aware of the challenges to economic security. At the same time, vocabulary 
evolved also, shifting from ‘economic war’, ‘competitive intelligence’ and ‘economic watch’ 
only, to ‘economic intelligence’, which aims to encompass all aspects of the globalised 
risks and opportunities and that is based on an upstream understanding and a 
multidisciplinary approach of the threats that need to be addressed. Also, since the 
French are French, there were a lot of semantic debates on the word ‘intelligence’, which 
is now accepted in its two meanings: the basic French one, intelligence as the ability to 
think and analyse, and the British one, which relates to the collection and treatment of 
information. These debates are more important than they might appear at first glance, 
since at the beginning the second meaning led to confusion with espionage, thus giving 
rise to strong criticism and mistrust towards these new approaches. 
 
Today, economic intelligence is recognised as a professional tool for strategy and 
management for States and companies in the globalised world. Its implementation is 
based on three main pillars: (1) the mastering of strategic information, which means its 
early collection, analysis and treatment, in order to understand and anticipate one’s 
external environment; this first step is often called ‘watch’ and is indispensable to the two 
other pillars; (2) economic security, which is defensive and directed at protecting 
economic assets, especially immaterial ones; and (3) influence –active or offensive–, 
which means to be at the cutting edge for seeking opportunities and innovation and to be 
able to act on one’s environment (regulations, norms, image…) and not only be passively 
dependent on it. The three pillars have been defined in order to make it easier to 
understand and implement the concept, although they are actually interdependent. An 
example: for a company, failing to anticipate a new crucial European norm in its sector is 
the result of a poor watch that might put it at risk, revealing a lack of influence and 
network as well. It is the same for States at the international and multilateral levels. 
 
Economic intelligence policies try to respond to risks and threats which originate in the 
major changes that have affected the world these past 40 years: globalised competition 
and the increasing role of information in economic affairs. The globalisation of competition 
means that there are now many more and different players than before, in both the 
domestic and international markets; an increasingly mixed role played by both private and 
public bodies (with the privatisation of formerly national strategic fields such as 
infrastructure or energy and the growing role of private regulations and soft law); and, 
finally, an interdependence between economic, political, social, scientific and cultural 
forces and causes in nearly all issues. Broadly speaking, there are four main categories of 
bodies that are competing at the same level: (1) private ones, ie, companies, funds and 
banks, and professional associations; (2) multilateral global or regional organisations; (3) 
the heterogeneous world of non-state organisations, among which are NGOs, Institutes, 
think tanks, ranking agencies and norm producers; and (4) States, which have territorially 









limited powers and less and less autonomy as regards international regulations and 
powers. Moreover, the international balance of power is changing every day between 
‘developed’, ‘developing’ and ‘emerging’ countries, the latter being in most cases strongly 
helped by sovereign funds. This refers only to legal powers, since, in addition, illegal and 
criminal groups, associations, networks and sometimes States, among others, also play 
tough at the international level. 
 
Another leading characteristic of our globalised world is that information has become a 
driving force as vital as any physical source of energy. The sharing of information and the 
easy access to it for everybody creates great new opportunities but also generates new 
threats in the scientific, biological, technological and financial fields as well as in questions 
of image and reputation, and allows informal and fast operations to be carried out. The 
interaction between economic information and public opinion has steadily risen since 
December 1999, when the Seattle Round of negotiations of the World Trade Organisation 
failed, and an international public opinion has emerged that is relatively easy to influence 
by the web and the so-called social networks. 
 
In summary, economic security is very often, if not always, a matter of the prompt and 
correct treatment of information. Economic intelligence sees information as both a threat 
and a tool, in any case a matter to be seriously considered and worked on. Threats and 
opportunities can come from anywhere and can no longer be defined as purely public or 
purely private, having to be tackled by each player, public, private or associative at their 
own micro or macroeconomic level, but acting in networks. States, which are the 
traditional guarantors of security on their territory, have lost part of their power of 
regulation and policing both on their own ground and at the international level, even if, due 
to the global financial crisis, they now seem to be willing to regain some of the ground lost 
by joining forces (although still to a limited extent). This new environment simply imposes 
alliances between public and private forces sharing the same approach to the new global 
environment, under –in our personal view– balanced public supervision, since the markets 
on their own seem unable to ensure economic security. Tackling these new risks and 
threats and seizing the huge opportunities opened up by this new scenario implies, first of 
all, having a better knowledge of the cultures, ways of thinking and behaviour of the ‘new’ 
players, which are often so different from the West’s ‘rational’ thinking and of its ideas of 
the Law. This is probably the hardest task and is as important –perhaps more– as finding 
new technical tools to protect companies and States. Also, it cannot be ignored that, 
ultimately, in European continental countries, economic intelligence raises the political 
issue of the general interest versus the role of markets –although this is not the place to 
discuss such a wide-ranging issue, even if the answer to this question is the cornerstone 
of a consistent economic intelligence policy–. 
 
From the Concept to its Implementation 
At first sight, the term ‘economic security’ seems to be a contradiction in a liberal 
economy. Capitalism is based on a certain degree of insecurity: the life and death of 
economic players is in the nature of the system and the market itself is the guarantor 
economic wealth and stability. In this conception, State involvement is unnecessary 
because economic security is reduced to a matter of competition between companies. 
Hence, in principle, the role of the Anglo-Saxon liberal State in economic security should 
naturally be weak. However, reality is very different, because economic security and 
economic intelligence have emerged from the globalisation of the economy and because 
the US in particular managed to correctly anticipate (and influence) the globalisation 
process before most of its Western competitors did so. 









Even if everything is interconnected with everything else in our complex and globalised 
world, it is necessary to make distinctions when implementing economic intelligence 
policies between: (1) threats which concern companies only; (2) threats which concern 
companies which for any reason have sensitive know-how or work on future sensitive 
matters (sensitive in this case meaning links to the national interest); and (3) threats at the 
macro-economic level, which concern the economy as a whole and the State itself. At a 
world level, one could add macroeconomic global security, an issue beyond this paper’s 
scope. 
 
In our view, the State is concerned with each of these levels to different degrees. The idea 
which legitimates State action is that private risks, if not addressed, can become national 
risks, for instance by missing out on national technological innovations or know-how and 
so losing jobs and wealth in the medium term. But in some cases the State will act by 
promoting networking or providing basic information, while in other cases it will act 
directly. All risks and opportunities can be approached at the micro or macroeconomic 
levels, often together. The examples listed below are obviously far from exhaustive but 
they help explain the role of the State. 
 
Companies can become the targets of financial threats from investors –private or 
sovereign investment funds– interested in taking shares in their capital for their 
technology, R&D, know-how or simply profitability. In the first cases, this can also be a 
problem for the State. In France, a decree was issued in December 2005 according to 
which non-EU foreign investments are subject to State authorisation if they concern a 
sensitive activity. Nevertheless, it is always difficult for State authorities to make a choice 
between an opportunity (like a foreign investor announcing the creation or preservation of 
jobs) and a potential long-term threat. It is the same for investors requesting changes in 
national rules (for instance, Sharia-compliant rules or fundamental and long-term shifts in 
the law). 
 
The new standard accounting rules (International Financial Reporting Standards, IFRS) 
are another interesting example: they were drafted by a private body, the London-based 
International Accounting Standards Board (IASB), at the European Commission’s request, 
and then became European rules. They led to sudden large-scale changes in the 
accounts of many companies and banks, clearly weakening many of them. There have 
been numerous complaints about the rules, so why did States or professional 
associations not play a greater role in their drafting, which deals with a core question of 
the economy? When it comes to the role of the international financial markets in 
supporting or weakening States, it is macroeconomic security that is involved, but it is 
usual to hear that States are powerless. In fact, they cannot anticipate in time and play a 
role in world governance, which obviously needs regulations and not only self-regulations 
(as in the banking sector) or quasi-private regulations (the role of the rating agencies). 
 
Threats can also come from a country’s own law, which is no longer adapted to the tough 
competitive globalised environment. For instance, France provides free detailed financial 
information on companies to the country’s competitors, as it is simple to consult the 
Register of Commerce, to which all French companies have the legal obligation to send 
their full accounts annually, and which are open to anyone. This is not the case in many 
other industrialised countries and the matter is currently being re-considered. In the same 
way, although the risk of information, financial or otherwise, being stolen is covered by 
safety and security processes –like those recommended by two ISO norms and the 
EBIOS norm on risk management (Expression des Besoins et Identification des Objectifs 









de Sécurité)–, a law was additionally proposed in France in 2009 to define and qualify a 
new legal offence, information theft. The problem is that until now only material and not 
immaterial things can be subject to theft. 
 
Another significant source of risk is the vulnerability of electronic data information and all 
information and communication technologies, in which the threat is human in nature. 
Economic intelligence is also a matter of adequate human management: it is recognised 
that the primary risks are internal, deriving from careless or unsatisfied employees. 
Numerous guides and booklets have been drafted by French professional organisations 
giving basic principles which should be complied with, but some principles of human 
management should be added to the programmes of Business Schools. On the broad 
topic of illegal groups, criminal threats, money laundering or suchlike, companies can 
obtain basic information by themselves, or from private business intelligence companies, 
which incidentally must be used with caution, because there are legal limits to such 
private action and then they must contact State services. This is one of the reasons why 
in France, experts from the Police and Gendarmerie have been seconded to regional and 
departmental Préfets. Their role is essentially to make companies aware of the threats 
although they are in charge if the threats actually materialise. 
 
One real and growing risk concerns image, reputation and e-reputation. All economic 
players are concerned: companies of course, but also countries. Everybody knows the 
consequences of a destabilisation campaign, which cannot be generally legally 
prosecuted, since the attacks are made from countries subject to no regulations. 
Nevertheless, they can be anticipated and prevented in most cases by systematically 
monitoring the web and other sources of information, and by professionally preparing a 
response in the event of a crisis. It is the same for States. Also, authors in France are 
working on a new theory, economic self-defence, in reference to physical self-defence in 
criminal law. It is as yet only a theory, and its implementation can only be carried out at an 
international level. 
 
The issue of international regulations, norms and ratings should be carefully addressed by 
all economic players, from the point of view of both security and influence. Ratings have 
consequences on the image and reputation of individual companies, but also on 
countries, in both the short (financial ratings) and long terms (ratings on competiveness, 
education levels, governance and business law). These soft-power tools can gradually 
shape and influence State policies, which aim to improve ratings and adopt proposals 
suggested by those responsible for the ratings (a process which could be considered anti-
democratic). Of course, it is not a question of refusing an assessment, but of being able to 
clearly know how, why and by whom rankings or ratings are determined. The same 
process by which influence is exerted can be seen in the preparation of international 
regulations and norms, not only in the technical but also in the ethical and environmental 
fields. Furthermore, it is important to be aware of the ‘norms business’, as especially in 
sustainable development and corporate responsibility matters regulations are made by a 
small number of bodies for which it is a very profitable business since they control the 
whole market: the production of norms, the training of those affected, the auditing of their 
correct application and –after five to six years– the drafting of new norms in order to adapt 
to new situations, with the whole cycle then starting again. In these matters, economic 
security is closely linked to influence. 
 
 









In a broader approach, economic intelligence is linked to industrial policies, as it 
addresses the capacity of seeing opportunities, encouraging innovation and defining long-
term economic priorities (always based on the correct anticipation of strengths and 
weaknesses in the future, in relation with the evolution of competitors and world 
resources). As regards companies, the main problem –and the main task for States and 
professional organisations– to be tackled is to bring the issue to the attention of decision 
makers, especially in small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) that are the most 
exposed to these problems and convince them of the need to invest in economic 
intelligence policies, for which the return on investment is obviously difficult to establish. 
One of the main difficulties of economic intelligence is that it is based on qualitative 
analyses and evidence, while key decision makers are often ‘quantitative-minded’ only. 
Studies are under way to try to define indicators. 
 
Conclusions: The key factors of success in economic intelligence policies and 
processes, for both States and companies, are: (1) the ability to anticipate, which means 
not only to project or extrapolate the past, but to imagine new schemes, by cross-thinking 
and linking expertise and approaches; (2) the ability to adapt structures and laws to faster 
new processes; and (3) setting up networks of competence and cooperation, particularly 
between the public and private sectors but also between States sharing the same general 
interests, as in the case of the EU. 
 
Economic security and economic intelligence must not be understood as purely defensive 
strategies, as a withdrawal into one’s shell, but as the first step in building active policies 
and alliances, the latter being a prerequisite to act and seize opportunities in a globalised 
world. This is known as ‘co-opetition’, a key concept for companies and States alike and 
akin to smart power, that combines cooperation and competition, since on the one hand 
we are faced with hard adversaries and vital challenges while on the other pure economic 
war is ineffective in the long run. 
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